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How Privacy Got Its Gender 
ANITA L. ALLEN AND ERIN MACK* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Like the Olympian Athena, the right to privacy was born not of 
woman, but of man. A century ago this year, Samuel D. Warren and 
Louis D. Brandeis published The Right to Privacy.' This "most 
influential law review article of a11" 2 argued for express recognition 
of a new common law right, a right of privacy, protecting the 
"inviolate personality" 3 of the individual, the "sacred precincts of 
private and domestic life, " 4 and the "robustness of thought and 
delicacy of feeling" 5 in society. 
The privacy tort was the brainchild of nineteenth-century men of 
privilege, and it shows. Harry Kalven noticed it, writing of the Warren 
and Brandeis privacy plea that ''there is a curious nineteenth century 
quaintness about the grievance, an air of wounded gentility.' ' 6 The 
Right to Privacy's quaint gentility reflects not only the economically 
privileged perspective of its Harvard Law School-educated authors, 7 
* Anita L. Allen is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; 
J.D ., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., The University of Michigan. Erin Mack, J.D., 
Georgetown University Law Center, is an Associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. 
Professor Allen presented earlier versions of this paper as a keynote address at the 
7th Annual National Graduate Women's Studies Conference, University of Pennsyl-
vania, February 23, 1990, and as a Davies Lecture at the University of San Francisco, 
April 4, 1990. 
I. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
2. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW 
AND CoNTEMP. PROB. 326, 327 (1966). See generally T. McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.3 (1989). 
3. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205. 
4. !d. at 195. 
5. !d. at 196. 
6. Kalven, supra note 2, at 329. 
7. A native Bostonian, Samuel D. Warren II was the son of a wealthy paper 
manufacturer and a member of Boston's social elite. Louis D. Brandeis' immigrant 
family owned a small mercantile shop in Louisville. See D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND 
PRESS 21-24 (1972) (describing social backgrounds of Warren and Brandeis). 
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but also the pronounced sentimentality8 and spirituality9 that were 
characteristic of the period. 
Moreover, as conceived by Warren and Brandeis and initially 
applied by the courts, the privacy tort bears the unmistakable mark 
of an era of male hegemony. This aspect of the privacy tort has gone 
all but unnoticed. Our aim is to suggest that attention to the privacy 
tort's social origins in an era of sexual inequality illuminates the 
course of its historic development. Scholarly and judicial analyses that 
appropriately acknowledge the significance of gender provide an 
important direction for the privacy tort's second century. 
Part II sets the stage with brief, background perspectives on the 
meaning and value of privacy, the public/ private distinction, and the 
history of opportunities for personal privacy and autonomous deci-
sionmaking in American life. 
Part III examines The Right to Privacy in context, stressing the 
outmoded normative assumptions about female modesty and seclusion 
implicit in its bid for more legal protection against unwanted publicity. 
The monumental legacy of Warren and Brandeis did not include a 
broad or egalitarian understanding of the need for privacy. 
Part IV offers Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Women and Econom-
ics as evidence that such an understanding was within the grasp of 
8. See generally A. DoUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CuLTURE, 6, 
12-13, 289 (1976) (historical study of "[t]he minister and the lady" as socially 
appointed "champions of sensibility") . Focussing on the country's northeast region, 
Douglas identified in nineteenth-century American writing a sentimental emphasis on 
spiritual values, often symbolized by images of fair, fragile young women-hence the 
"feminization" of culture. According to Douglas, "[t]he sentimentalization of theo-
logical and secular culture was an inevitable part of the self-evasion of a society both 
committed to laissez-faire industrial expansion and disturbed by its consequences." 
Jd. at 12. 
9. See generally L. PERRY, INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 263-67, 
277-78 (ideology of culture "upheld the far-reaching importance of spiritual values 
amid secular change" that included urbanization, industrialization, and "shallow 
commercialism"). The ideology culture was a major force in Harvard University 
intellectual life when Warren and Brandeis were students there. Id. at 285. NATION 
editor E. L. Godkin was a prominent pundit for the ideal of culture. Jd. at 310-11. 
Although Warren and Brandeis would deny it fifteen years later, it has been suggested 
that an article by Godkin in ScRIBNER's MAGAZINE in July, 1890 condemning press 
invasions of privacy inspired The Right to Privacy. See D. PEMBER, supra note 7 at 
24-25; and see GoDKIN, infra note 13. See also R. HixsoN, PRIVACY IN A PuBLIC 
SociETY: HuMAN RIGHTS IN CoNFLICT 30 (1987) (" [T]here is reason to believe that 
Godkin's ScRIBNER's piece , as well as the famous editor's reputation among intellec-
tuals, contributed to their thinking .. . . Indeed, Warren and Brandeis cited Godkin 
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the late nineteenth-century intellect. 10 An egalitarian understanding of 
women's privacy problems is certainly within our reach today. Re-
grettably, courts and scholars still defend legal privatization of family 
life and personal identity without always considering the complex role 
that concerns about female modesty and seclusion have had, and 
should have, in the law. 
Many privacy problems women face as daughters, wives and 
mothers cannot be addressed effectively through tort law. Tort law 
cannot, for example, create more free time for new mothers. However, 
cases highlighted in Part V illustrate that privacy tort actions and 
emotional distress actions for "outrageous conduct" can potentially 
right privacy wrongs. Existing categories of privacy torts potentially 
have one of their most worthwhile applications as aids to female 
victims of gender-related privacy invasions. Stereotypes of heightened 
female modesty undermined the nominal victories of female privacy 
claimants in the decades immediately following The Right to Privacy. 
The cases we consider in Part V suggest that, despite origins in 
nineteenth-century gender bias, the privacy torts most states recognize 
can help to validate women's economic and dignitarian interests m 
freedom from physical and emotional abuse in the workplace. 
II. 
A. CONCEPT AND VALUE 
Personal privacy exists wherever a degree of inaccessibility shel-
ters persons or information about them from others. 11 Seclusion, 
solitude, anonymity, secrecy, confidentiality, and reserve are discrete 
forms of privacy .12 While privacy is a phenomenon in every human 
10. C. PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC 
RELATION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1898). 
11. See generally A. ALLEN, UNEASY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WoMEN IN A FREE 
SociETY 11, 15 (1988) (analyzing competing philosophical definitions of "privacy") 
("While no definition of 'privacy' is universally accepted, definitions in which the 
concept of access play a role have become increasingly commonplace .... To say 
that a person possesses or enjoys privacy is to say that, in some respect and to some 
extent, the person (or the person's mental state or information about the person) is 
beyond the range of others' five senses and any devices that can enhance, reveal, 
trace or record human conduct, thought, belief or emotion.") . Cf. Post, The Social 
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. 
L. REv. 957, 969 (1989) (concept of privacy underlying privacy tort not neutral, 
descriptive , or value free). 
12. A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 18 ("Privacy is best viewed as a kind of parent 
or umbrella concept to those ... [concepts such as seclusion, solitude, anonymity, 
confidentiality, secrecy, intimacy and/ or reserve] that denote a person's conditions 
of inaccessibility to the senses and surveillance devices of others."). 
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society, its availability and perceived value vary with culture, econ-
omy, status, age, and gender. 13 Gender is a key social variable in the 
availability of certain forms of individual and group privacy .14 Social 
scientist Barrington Moore suggests that in many cultures men achieve 
privacy at the expense of privacy-deficient women, whose domestic 
labor maintains patriarchic havens. 15 
Of special interest here , gender is also an important variable in 
how much value a society places on modesty, a form of reserve. 16 
Modesty consists of acts of refraining from ostentation and self-
praise. Traditional norms of female modesty in American culture 
required that women, much more than men, exhibit speech , dress , 
and behavior calculated to deflect attention from their bodies, views , 
or desi res . Needless to say, expectations of female self-concealment 
and seclusion in the name of modesty have greatly diminished. But 
nineteenth-century women faced condemnation for immodesty when 
they sought the services of male physicians and lawyers, spoke publicly 
about politics, entered beauty contests, and pursued careers in medi-
cine or as clergy. 17 Activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton criticized the 
socialites of her day, who attended balls in strapless gowns and 
danced in the arms of strangers, but balked at the immodesty of 
speaking out for women's rights in public places .18 
Conditions of privacy are not always morally praiseworthy or 
psychologically desirable. Yet it is difficult to deny that meaningful 
forms of individual privacy empower persons and enhance their 
intimate relationships .19 Moreover, because the well-being of a family 
13 . ALAN F. WESTIN, PRrvACY AND FREEDOM 13 (1967). But see Godkin, The 
Rights of the Citizen: To His Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER's MAGAZINE 58, 65 (1890) 
("Privacy is ... one of the luxuries of civilization, which is not only unsought for 
but unknown in primitive or barbarous societies. The savage cannot have privacy, 
and does not desire or dream of it."). Warren and Brandeis cited the Godkin article 
with apparent approval. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. 
14. Cj. Roberts and Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, in PRrvACY, 182, 210 
(J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman ed. 1971). 
15. B. MooRE, PRrvACY: STUDIES IN SociAL AND CuLTURAL HISTORY 51-52 
(1984) . 
16. A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 19. 
17. !d. at 20. Cj. P. GLAZER and M. SLATER, UNEQUAL CoLLEAGUES: THE 
ENTRANCE OF WOMEN INTO THE PROFESSIONS, 1890-1940 12-13 , 81 (1987) ("The 
medical training meant that she had to violate Victorian standards of female modesty 
regarding bodily functions."); L. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
255 -57 (1983) (middle-class morality initially hostile to women on di splay in commer-
cial beauty contests). 
18 . A . ALLEN, supra note 11 at 20. 
19. !d. at 45-52. 
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or community is a function of the well-being of its members, privacy 
can make a man or woman more fit for group contribution and 
participation. 20 According to some psychologists, privacy promotes 
beneficial states and activities. Self-reflection, imagination, and relax-
ation are but a few of the valued results of privacy. 21 Privacy is also 
thought to foster individuality and the autonomy of judgment presup-
posed by western morality and liberalism. 22 Although personal privacy 
is occasionally condemned categorically as furthering indifference, 
social alienation, and inefficiency, philosophers typically praise diverse 
forms of individual, corporate , and group privacy for their functional 
utility and moral value. 23 
B. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
"Privacy" denotes conditions of physical or informational inac-
cessibility, such as solitude or secrecy. But it can also designate ''the 
private sphere'' and a degree of autonomy within it. The existence of 
privacy does not presuppose the existence of a private sphere; none-
theless the concept of privacy is often associated with the concept of 
a private sphere constituted by lives free of unwanted governmental 
and community interference. Our homes, families, sexuality, and 
friendships are deemed appropriately private affairs. Religion, edu-
cation, and business are sometimes included among the appropriately 
private aspects of human society as well. 
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt explained that the 
public/private distinction has been a feature of Western thought at 
least since the rise of the ancient city-state, when it denoted the 
political and household realms, respectively. 24 In Greek and classical 
Roman thought, the private sphere of the household was viewed as a 
sphere of necessity in which the dominant male of the family ruled 
over wife, children, and servants who were engaged in mutual efforts 
20. !d. 
21. See, e.g., A. Buss, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESs AND SociAL ANXIETY (1980); T. 
MILBURN and K. WATMAN, ON THE NATURE OF THREAT: A SociAL PsYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1981); C. Schneider, SHAME , EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY (1977); S. SEAGERT, 
CROWDING IN REAL ENVIRONMENTS (1976). See also A. ALLEN, supra note II, at 45. 
22. A. ALLEN, supra note II, at 48. Cf. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 
HARv. L. REv. 737, 805 (1989) (liberal privacy rights protect against totalitarian 
regulation). 
23. !d. at 41-53. 
24. H. ARENDT, THE HuMAN CoNDITION 28 (1958). For a quite different 
presentation of the same history, see J. HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY, 2, 3 
(1989) (T. Burger trans. 1962). 
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for survival. By contrast, the public sphere was seen as a sphere of 
freedom where men of virtue, who had mastered the private sphere, 
joined forces as equals and citizens to govern and defend their 
communities. 
With respect to the United States and, indeed, the modern world 
in general, it is impossible to make a sharp distinction between the 
public and the private. Few aspects of contemporary American life 
are plausibly deemed wholly beyond public regulation. For example, 
because homosexual marriages are prohibited, marriage cannot be 
viewed as a wholly private matter between consenting adults. Child 
abuse and neglect statutes and the law of child custody reveal that 
childrearing is very much a matter of public regulation. The demar-
cation of public and private that may have once characterized the 
city-state does not apply as a description or ideal for the contemporary 
nation-state. The public and private are now merged into what Arendt 
usefully distinguished as a "social realm. " 25 Government and com-
munity have taken on some of the protective attributes of the family. 
At the same time, women, children, and laborers have progressed 
toward the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship. 
The idea of a social realm better describes the actual organization 
of American society than dichotomies of public and private. However, 
normative conceptions of public and private serve as powerful remin-
ders of the still prevalent need to limit the reach of group life. The 
public/private distinction and the notion of appropriately public and 
private spheres persist in debates over the limits of collective regula-
tion. They persist dramatically in debates over the rights of women, 
as exemplified by the current abortion law controversies. 
In the nineteenth century, the ideology of "true womanhood" 
and the "cult of domesticity" justified the confinement of women in 
the private household as subservient caretakers. 26 Middle-class white 
women often had a great deal of privacy, in the sense of socially 
imposed isolation within a private household. However, across races 
and classes, women were seldom heads of households, had little time 
to themselves, and had little of the legal autonomy concerning sexu-
ality, marriage, and the family that sometimes is called "decisional 
privacy'' today. 27 
25. ARENDT, supra note 24 at 68-72. 
26. A. Allen, supra note 11, at 65. But see L. NICHOLSON, GENDER AND 
HISTORY 62 (1986) ("ideal of female domesticity in the nineteenth century never had 
as much relevance for black people as for middle class white people."). 
27. Reacting to this tradition, feminists and other progressive thinkers have 
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C. WOMEN'S PRIVACY HERITAGE 
A look at social history from the American colonial era to 1890 
when Warren and Brandeis published The Right to Privacy gives rise 
to three important points about the period. First, physical and infor-
mational forms of privacy were within the reach of many women as 
incidents to rural or small-town life, or as required by norms of 
female modesty and domesticity. Second , women 's physical seclusion 
within the home did not guarantee meaningful for ms of individual 
privacy. The demands of childrearing, nursing , and housekeeping 
meant little independence or time alone . Third, women's privacy in 
the sense of autonomous decisionmaking (even about domestic mat-
ters) was closely circumscribed by legal and other social norms. By 
virtue of these conditions, both from our perspective in the 1990s and 
that of feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman in the 1890s, women's 
privacy was problematic. 
1. Pre-Industrial and Rural Life 
Privacy was valued in colonial America for many of the same 
reasons it is valued today. Centuries prior to the arrival of the 
colonists, "privacy" was used in the English language to denote "the 
state or condition of being withdrawn from the society of others, or 
from public interest. " 28 The value of privacy as the state of withdrawal 
from the public sphere was echoed in church commands to carry on 
devotions ''with all possible Privacy and Modesty,' ' 29 and to keep 
prayer "publick [sic] in the Congregation, private in the Family, and 
secret in the Closet. " 30 While privacy per se was not expressly recog-
nized as the basis of a legal right in colonial America, privacy did 
play a part in custom and legal practice. In fact, the colonial legal 
system protected physical and informational privacy by limiting searches 
and seizures, prosecuting trespassers, hearing defamation cases, and 
sometimes equated the concepts of privacy and the private sphere with fem ale 
subjugation . See generally ALLEN, supra note 11, at 45 -56, 72-75 (stressing the equality 
of men's and women's normative moral entitlement to individual modes of privacy 
and autonomous decisionmaking). One feminist purported to rej ect the legal cate-
gories of privacy and the private sphere as "male ideology ." See C. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 53 (1988). Recognizing a "debt to nurture," another has called 
for the restructuring of the private through forms of family li fe that do not "repeat 
the earlier terms of female oppression. " J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN 
322-53 (1981). 
28. D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN CoLONIAL NEw ENGLAND 10 (1972). 
29. !d. 
30. !d. at 11-12. 
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protecting privileged husband and wife communications in the court-
room. 31 
Yet, the colonial lifestyle "left little room for privacy or non-
conformity even among the free and affluent. " 32 The community 
spirit ran strong in the colonies and there was a pervasive belief that 
individuals and families should make sacrifices for the good of the 
community. Norms of mutual surveillance enforced by officials con-
strained disorderliness and moral deviance. 33 
However , the threat to privacy posed by government control was 
lessened by lax enforcement and respect for social relationships that 
were enhanced by privacy, such as courtship Y Respect for the family 
also undercut public regulation. The family household-often an 
extended conglomeration of spouses, children, servants, apprentices, 
and other dependents-was governed by male patriarchs. 35 The com-
munity delegated to men the authority to control those living within 
their domain and all family property. While appointed community 
officials were expected to insure families' conformity to public stan-
dards, landed males as heads of families were expected to maintain 
well-ordered and well-governed households. The structure of the 
colonial family thus mirrored the structure of the larger society; both 
were interdependent, hierarchical, and patriarchal.36 
American colonial life centered around an agrarian and mercan-
tile economy. It generally featured rural homesteads and sparsely 
populated towns. In rural areas, a large homestead built on several 
acres could be the common home of parents, married children, and 
employees, all subject to masculine family authority. In the towns, a 
male head of household often maintained a work area or business 
next to his home. Families tended to be large and households often 
included one or more domestic servants, apprentices, and other de-
pendent workers. 
There was little rigid delineation of responsibilities and duties 
within many early American homes. Rural life and interdependence 
among family members offered free colonial women many rights and 
31. !d. at 248. 
32. S. KENNEDY, IF Au WE Dro WAs TO WEEP AT HoME: A HISTORY OF WHITE 
WORKING-CLASS WOMEN IN MODERN AMERICA 8 (1979) . 
33. FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 248. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. 
36. M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 6 (1985). 
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liberties that women in other countries did not enjoy Y Yet, through-
out the pre-industrial period, women remained subordinate and de-
pendent in caretaking roles. The multitudes of women who lived as 
slaves or servants enjoyed the least privacy and autonomy of all. 
However , even free, working white women were short on privacy and 
independence. 38 
2. Age of Industry 
Concern for privacy and privacy-related liberties achieved prom-
inence as public issues in the nineteenth century when a sharp increase 
in technology and industrialization had begun to transform the agrar-
ian and mercantile culture to one of urban capitalism. A marked 
growth in commerce and industry meant more people could work for 
pay and no longer had to rely on farming or apprenticing to earn a 
living. The home workshop was rendered virtually obsolete, and male 
breadwinners moved their trades into the urban centers that were 
rapidly springing up to accommodate large-scale mechanization and 
a growing labor force. 39 
Households declined in size in some social strata. Several factors 
worked to decrease the size of the average professional worker's 
household, including the greatly reduced need for apprentices and 
journeymen workers, the technological advances in home appliances 
that made a large force of domestic servants unnecessary, and the 
lack of housing in urban centers that would accommodate extended 
families. These demographic forces combined with republican40 and 
37. !d. 
38. Cf. S. KENNEDY, supra note 32, at 36-37 (lives of white women who worked 
in mills and as live-in domestics strictly controlled and scrutinized) . 
39. M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, 
NEW YORK, 1790-1865 147 (1981). 
40. M. GRossBERG, supra note 36, at 6-7. A notable feature of the republican 
ideology of post-Revolutionary American society was the idea that the preservation 
of the public good was the most important goal of a political society, and that this 
goal was attained through virtuous citizens who were willing to sacrifice individual 
interests to the needs of the public good, were independent of the political will of 
others, and who participated in politics and actively exercised their citizenship. But 
see L. PERRY, supra note 9, at 263 ("[B]y the latter half of the nineteenth century 
.. . [culture] served, much as virtue had done, to designate higher ideals that must 
shine atop the republic.") To these concepts could be added equality , in the sense 
that all citizens were entitled to representation in the civil and political process under 
a democratic system of laws. Pocock, Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth 
Century, 3 J.I.H. 119-34 (1972), cited in S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEw 
YORK CITY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WoRKING CLASS, 1788-1850 14 (1984). 
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laissez-faire41 sentiments to create the social, political and legal struc-
tures of the nineteenth century. 
The impact of industrialization on privacy and autonomy resists 
easy summation. According to Alan F. Westin, nuclear family life-
styles , mobility in work and residence, and the decline of religious 
authority meant "greater situations of physical and psychological 
privacy.' ' 42 While Westin associated urban industrialization with more 
privacy, Robert Copple recently associated the same developments 
with less privacy. Copple cited the convergence of the growth of cities 
that accompanied industrialization with the closing of the western 
fronti er as a possible explanation for the emergence of articulated 
public concern about lost privacy during the late nineteenth century. 43 
It should be noted that, although personal privacy was not a 
salient issue in public life for most of the nineteenth century, it could 
be an acute concern in private life. For example, as revealed in period 
diaries , the group life required by safe westward passage imposed 
privacy-related hardships on women who were forced to depart abruptly 
from standards of female modesty and seclusion. 44 The biographies 
of African-American slaves reflect extremes of humiliation and shame 
suffered by women reared as Christians but treated as chattel unsuited 
for privacy and private choice.45 Thus, neither the end of the westward 
41. M. RYAN, supra note 39, at 150-54. 
42. A. WESTIN, supra note 13, at 21. But see A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 66 
(privacy also a function of character of life within nuclear family home). 
43. Copple, Privacy and the Frontier Thesis: An American Intersection of Self 
and Society, 34 AM. J. JuRIS. 87, 88 (1989) ("threat to frontier values of individualism 
and autonomy . . . [where an] impetus for the creation and adoption of . . . legal 
means to protect personal privacy and to officially recognize the right to a .. . degree 
of social distance"). 
44. The journals kept by women on the overland trails document quotidian 
features of their arduous treks across the continent in the company of many men 
and few other women. The demanding realities of daily life included cooking, 
washing, cleaning, gathering herbs and berries, looking after small children, and 
caring for the sick and dying. L. SCHLISSEL, WOMEN'S DIARIES OF THE WESTWARD 
JouRNEY 77 (1982). Women who travelled alone with groups of men wrote of a 
profound sense of isolation at the loss of female friendship, conversation, and co-
workers. !d. at 98. The lack of shelter on the trail compromised their modesty 
concerns by exposing bodily functions such as excretion and menstruation. At least 
women travelling together could "provide a measure of propriety to a sister on the 
Trail" by extending their long skirts to act as a screen, creating a "curtain of 
modesty" for an otherwise embarrassing situation. !d. 
45. See, e.g., 0. ALBERT, THE HousE OF BoNDAGE (1988); Srx WoMEN's SLAVE 
NARRATIVES (H. Gates ed. 1988) (collection of nineteenth-century slave narratives). 
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expansion Copple stressed, nor the growth of photography and "yel-
low journalism" Warren and Brandeis decried, 46 began Americans' 
concerns about their privacy. 
Compared to the women of the 1820s, who "had neither legal, 
professional nor educational standing,'' the women of 1890 were 
seemingly on the road to equality. 47 Yet, the second half of the 
nineteenth century brought increased legal regulation of the "private 
sphere" of marriage, reproduction, and family life. As a consequence 
of legal expansion, when male freedom and self-reliance were held 
high as esteemed public values, the decisions of women concerning 
marriage, pregnancy , divorce, and child-rearing were subjected to new 
public scrutiny and regulation. 48 The Congressional passage of the 
Comstock Law in 1873 has come to symbolize the period. 49 Whether 
male or female, Victorian reformers often made no distinction between 
social concerns such as communicable diseases on the one hand, and 
moral concerns over women's exercise of reproductive autonomy on 
the other. Mid-century American society rested on the central tenets 
of ''permanency of marriage, the sacredness of the home, and the 
dependence of civilized life upon the family." 50 Early writers told of 
the ills that would befall the nation if families failed to promote 
"industry, frugality, temperance, moderation, and the whole lovely 
46. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. 
47. L. BANNER, WOMEN IN MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY 22 (1984). 
48. Family law historian Michael Grossberg attributed increased interest in 
"governing the hearth" to a fervent family reform movement. The movement arose, 
he argued, when individualism and diversity were perceived as a threat to an ideal he 
called the "republican family ." M. GRossBERG, supra note 36, at 10-11. Grossberg 
maintained that in the republican family, the colonial rule of status and unquestioning 
obedience among family members was replaced by affection, respect, and reciprocity. 
Relationships were largely seen in contractual terms that stressed "voluntary consent, 
reciprocal duties, and the possibility of dissolution." Yet the perception of marriage 
as a contract called for a delineation of household and economic responsibilities 
among the sexes. Males were generally charged with supporting the family. For the 
female, the home became her "exclusive domain," and domesticity her most out-
standing attribute. !d. at 6-7. Grossberg maintained that, as the republican family 
ideal gained ground, the faces of individualism and laissez-faire economics were 
treating diversity and deviations within and among families . Public concerns for the 
stability and well-being of the family contributed to a family reform movement that 
swept the nation, preaching paternalism, sexual restraint, and a strict economic 
division by labor. !d. at I 0-11. 
49. Act of 3 March 1873, 17 Stat. 258, amended, Act of 12 July 1876, 19 Stat. 
186. Named after Anthony Comstock, the Comstock Law and the copycat state laws 
it spawned banned pornography, abortion and contraception devices. See BANNER, 
supra note 47, at 16. 
50 . !d. 
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train of republican virtues. " 51 For reasons about which historians 
sometimes disagree, it became the perceived responsibility of women 
to safeguard and promote the highest ideals in their homes and 
children so as to keep society in tact. 52 
According to Michael Grossberg-whose account of history may 
overstate the pervasiveness and egalitarianism of the republican fam-
ily, and the novelty of legal pat riarchy-popular obsession with family 
integrity led to the enactment of major new legislation governing the 
hearth. The law of the second hal f of the last century thereby created 
an unprecedented judicial patriarchy overseeing the household. Given 
added authority to determine the legal status and abilities of married 
women and other family members, nineteenth-century judges further 
perpetuated patriarchic authority. They wielded control over marriage 
and other domestic matters, as evidenced by the law of courtship, 
nuptials, and domestic conduct. The common law notion of parens 
patriae gave the courts power to enter even the most private aspects 
of family life. Grossberg concluded that the judicial acquisition and 
exercise of patriarchal authority ''stemmed from the traditional as-
sumption that married women lacked the economic and intellectual 
independence to act without male supervision (and thus needed special 
protection), combined with the new faith in separate and mutually 
exclusive spheres ... central to the organization of the republican 
family. " 53 
The law of domestic relations resulted in a janus-faced policy. 
With a view toward female protection, judges could rationalize re-
warding women who successfully carried out their caretaking and 
household duties, and assisting women when problems arose during 
courtship and marriage. With a view toward female control, judges 
also could rationalize "invoking their authority to check radical 
alterations in the subordinate legal status of women. " 54 On Gross-
berg's account, then, judicial patriarchy in domestic law ensured 
continuing paternal control and governance of the home. If paternal 
51. !d. at 10. 
52 . Grossberg's account stressed "republican" values, but Ann Douglas stressed 
"sentimentalization." See A. DouGLAS, supra note 8, at 6-13. Echoing the mind-set 
Douglas identified, one legal writer announced that "[w]oman is generally conceded 
to be superior to man in beauty, sweetness , tenderness, parental care of children, 
virtue, sympathetic response, capacity to endure physical pain, home-making, refining 
influence on civilization and general moral and cultural excellence." Puller , When 
Equal Rights are Unequal, 13 VA. L. REv . 619, 629 (1927). 
53. M. Grossberg, supra note 36, at 300. 
54. Id. at 301 . 
.. _ 
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control over the family broke down, the judicial pat riarchy was there 
to take its place. Partly as a result of their own reformist activism, 55 
nineteenth-century women gained a greater presence in domestic re-
lations law. But they were not given the type of legal powers that 
brought greater economic, social, or political power inside or outside 
the home. 
3. Th e First Privacy Tort 
The assumption that women are properly dependent and confined 
to domestic roles had a corollary: women were deemed to be creatures 
of special modesty. Not only were women expected to observe con-
ventional rituals of modesty, as a prerequisite of virtue or respecta-
bility; but others similarly were expected to limit their encounters with 
women as modesty demanded . Women who worked outside the home 
or participated in public life could easily have their virtue thrown into 
question. 56 Anyone taking liberties with respectable women were sub-
ject to social sanction. These facts of social life were reflected in the 
development of the privacy tort. 
The standard of female modesty and seclusion was apparent in a 
much-cited Michigan case that predated the Warren and Brandeis 
article by nine years, De May v. RobertsY The facts of the case were 
simple. A poor, married couple invited a physician to their home to 
assist them and a midwife in the delivery of their child. Because the 
night was "dark and stormy, " 58 the physician brought along Scatter-
good, an "unprofessional young unmarried man, " 59 to carry his 
umbrella, lantern, and other necessary items. 60 Scattergood was pres-
ent in the Roberts' tiny house throughout the protracted labor. At 
the doctor's request, Scattergood held Mrs. Roberts' hand "during a 
paroxysm of pain. " 61 
55 . L. BANNER, supra note 47, at 16, 18-22. 
56 . See A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 65. In a lecture entitled "Of Queen's 
Gardens" the poet John Ruskin essayed that "the woman's true place" is the home, 
" the place of peace, the shelter . . . from all terror, doubt, and division. [In the 
sanctuary of the home] the woman must be enduringly, incorruptibly good, instinc-
tively, infallibly ... wise, not for self-development, but for self-renunciation: wise 
... with modesty of service." Id. Middle-class moralizers of both sexes viewed poor, 
immigrant and black women who were forced to work outside the home as falling 
short of the feminine ideal. 
57. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (18 81). 
58 . Id . at 162, 9 N.W. at 147. 
59. Jd. at 165, 9 N.W. at 148. 
60. Id. at 165, 9 N.W. at 147 . 
61. Id . 
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Some time after the birthing, the Robertses learned that Scatter-
good was not a medical practitioner. They filed a lawsuit against both 
Scattergood and Dr. De May. The jury awarded damages and the 
defendants appealed . Announcing that "[i]t would be shocking to our 
sense of right, justice and propriety to doubt ... that ... the law 
would afford an ample remedy, " 62 the court affirmed the finding that 
the defendants were guilty of deceit, and sustained the damages fo r 
Mrs . Roberts' "shame and mortification. " 63 
The court ' s declaration that "the plaintiff haC! a legal right to 
the privacy of her apartment" 64 was a first in American privacy 
jurisprudence. Edward J. Blaustein's anachronistic reading of De !Way 
as judicial vindication of women's "individuality and digni ty, " 65 
missed an important dimension of the case. A closer look at its social 
context suggests that the case is better viewed as a vindication of 
women's modesty. For, absent exceedingly strong female modesty and 
seclusion standards, it is difficult to explain why Mr. Scattergood and 
Dr. De May should have been liable at all. 
Bad weather, combined with Dr. De May's illness and fatigue , 
led him to bring Scattergood along. Those same conditions necessi-
tated that Scattergood remain in the plaintiffs' fourteen-by-sixteen 
foot house for the delivery. The court's decision implied that not even 
an exigent circumstance-a virtual emergency-can convert what is 
otherwise an invasion of privacy accomplished through deceit into 
privileged conduct. And, the court found deceit where arguably there 
was none. The case for deceit was not strong. De May expressly 
introduced Scattergood to the Robertses as a friend brought along to 
carry his things , not as a medical student or doctor. Nonetheless, the 
court concluded, as a matter of law, that the Robertses had a right 
to presume that a doctor would not bring an unmarried young man 
who was not a medical professional to the scene of a delivery . 
Strict adherence to a social standard of female seclusion and 
modesty is reflected in the court's conclusion as well as in its repetition 
of the adjective grouping "unprofessional, unmarried and young," 
when describing Scattergood . One is led to speculate that De May 
might have escaped liability by bringing along an old, married man 
to carry his things. In that case, the affront to the husband's house-
hold authority and the woman's presumed modesty would have been 
62. Id. at 166, 9 N.W . at 148-49. 
63. Id. at 167, 9 N .W. at 149. 
64. Jd. 
65. E. Blaustein , Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An A nswer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y .U. L. REv. 962, 973 (1964). 
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less severe. A young man or a young, unmarried man-unlike an old, 
married man-is a potential seducer. These considerations suggest 
that Blaustein's analysis of De A1ay as vindicating individuality and 
dignity is, at best, part of the truth. 66 It was mainly because women 
were deemed to be creatures of special modesty and their husbands 
their rightful protectors that the court found for the Robertses . Both 
in the elite urban East and the rural Mid-west, respect for women 's 
dignity consisted of respect for their modesty and other feminine 
virtues. The notion that female dignity required individuality belonged 
scarcely to the period at allY 
III. 
A. UNDERSTANDING "THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY" 
In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis contended that 
political, social, and economic changes had created a category of 
emotional or spiritual injury inadequately addressed by the law: the 
invasion of privacy. 68 The article depicted the invasion of privacy as 
an increasingly common consequence of both a flourishing urban free 
press, and the unauthorized circulation and publication of photo-
graphs produced with new technology. 
Warren and Brandeis argued that every man [sic] needs a place 
of solitude, a retreat from the "intensity and complexity of life, " 69 a 
sanctuary beyond the reach of scurrilous journalism, curiosity-seekers, 
gossips, and the prurient interests of the indolent public.70 The famous 
coauthors urged that the right "to be let alone, " 71 the right of privacy, 
66. Blaustein inadvertently ascribed privacy a masculine gender even as he 
attempted to celebrate it as a human right. Relying heavily on masculine rhetoric, he 
wrote: "A man whose home may be entered at the will of another, whose conver-
sations may be overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies 
may be overseen at the will of another is less than a man, has less . .. dignity, on 
that account." E. Blaustein, supra note 65, at 973-74 (emphasis added). Blaustein 
also suggested that "what provoked Warren and Brandeis to write their article was 
a fear that a rampant press feeding on the stuff of private life would destroy 
individual dignity and integrity and emasculate individual freedom." !d. at 971 
(emphasis added) . 
67 . Cf. L. BANNER, supra note 47, at I ("The 1890s were years of transi-
tion .... But in every area of women's experience discrimination still existed.") 
68 . Warren and Brandeis, supra note I, at 193, 195, 196, 197. 
69 . !d. at 196. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. at 195. 
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should be recognized to vouchsafe "inviolate personality, " 72 the "sa-
cred precincts of private and domestic life" 73 and the "robustness of 
thought and delicacy of feeling" in society. 74 Injuries to personality 
arising by virtue of acts ''overstepping ... the obvious bounds of 
propriety and of decency" 75 should be compensable, they argued, 
much as physical injury to body and property, interference with the 
peaceful use and enjoyment of property, and damage to reputation , 
family relations , and feelings were already legally compensable. 
Overwrought by today's standards, the Warren and Brandeis 
article was a lofty defense of values of affluence and gentility. 76 The 
article's proposal for a privacy tort grounded on human spirituality 
reflected the ''ideology of culture'' that once played a major role in 
the intellectual life of the American Northeast. 77 Culture stood in 
opposition to the supposed crass effects of commerce and industry 
on the human spirit. One noted advocate of the standard of culture, 
E. L. Godkin, published an attack on journalistic invasions of privacy 
in 1890 in Scribner's Magazine. Godkin's article appeared just months 
before Warren and Brandeis published theirs; 78 The Right to Privacy 
cited Godkin's article and may have been influenced by it. 79 
Like Godkin, Warren and Brandeis reacted with disfavor to uses 
of journalism and photography that, while commonplace today, were 
once novel and widely criticized. Indeed, the development of the 
halftone plate that permitted the reproduction of photographs in 
newspapers in the 1880s led the way in the 1890s to gimmicks and 
spectacles, including beauty contests sponsored by circus entrepreneurs 
and mass circulation newspapers "whose editors boldly utilized sex 
and violence as part of their appeal.' '80 The commercial exploitation 
of female beauty was a development initially fought by the middle-
and upper-classes. 81 In the age of culture, commercial displays of 
72. !d. at 205 . 
73. !d. at 195. 
74. !d. at 196. 
75. !d. 
76. Kalven, supra note 2, at 329. 
77. L. PERRY, supra note 9, at 263-67, 277-78. 
78. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To His Reputation, 8 ScRIBNER's 
MAGAZINE 58, 65 (1890). 
79. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 n. 6. But see D. PEMBER , supra 
note 7, at 24. Brandeis wrote to Warren in 1905 that: "My own recollection is that 
it was not Godkin's article but a specific suggestion of yours, as well as your deepest 
abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy, which led to our taking up the inquiry ." 
Warren concurred. !d. 
80. L. BANNER, supra note 17, at 256-57. 
81. !d. at 255. 
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women would have been difficult to reconcile with reigning myths of 
female moral superiority, spiritual leadership and heightened sensibil-
ities.82 
Personal experiences with unwanted publicity concerning his Bos-
ton Brahmin family's social life may have prompted Warren to 
coauthor the famous article. 83 Whatever its immediate causes, the 
article has had a decided impact on positive tort law. 84 The article 
also has had an impact on legal scholarship, setting into motion one 
hundred years of debate over the meaning and value of privacy, and 
the feasibility of protecting privacy through private and public law. 
Praised for its role in helping courts to recognize that "privacy 
[is] an aspect of human dignity , " 85 the Warren and Brandeis article 
has been roundly criticized in recent decades as narrow and anach-
ronistic . Critics say Warren and Brandeis spawned a petty, duplicative, 
and constitutionally problematic tort that has proven to be useless to 
plaintiffs and to society. 86 Without regard to the overall usefulness 
and constitutionality of the torts it spawned, the article can be 
criticized for inadequately addressing women's privacy and its histor-
ically problematic character. Warren and Brandeis employed language 
and arguments that perpetuated in the law the ideal of the cloistered 
lady. 
B. A FRESH LOOK 
Scholarly analyses traditionally focus on the large number of 
copyright and literary property cases Warren and Brandeis cited. 87 
This focus is substantially warranted. Pressing that sensibilities and 
self-regard are the touchstones of the inviolate personality, Warren 
82. See generally A. DouGLAS, supra note 8, at 6, 12-13; M . VrcrNus, INDE-
PENDENT WoMEN: 1860- 1920 4, 5 (1985). 
83. See, e.g., Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). But see T. 
McCARTHY, supra note 2 (casting doubt on claim that Warren's anger over press 
intrusion in own life motivated article). 
84. The article is cited in virtually every case utilized by the highest state courts 
as a vehicle for recognizing or refusing to recognize privacy rights. For a convenient 
list of these cases, see Copple, supra note 43, at 126-131. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 652A (1977) credits the Warren and Brandeis article with originating the 
privacy tort. 
85. See generally E . Bloustein, supra note 65. 
86. See generally Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to 
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 291 (1983) (plaintiffs 
seldom win and tort largely duplicative and constitutionally problematic); Kalven, 
supra note 2 (tort is petty, duplicative and constitutionally problematic). 
87. D. PEMBER , supra note 7, at 44-52. 
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and Brandeis arrived at the legal basis for a general substantive law 
of privacy partly by drawing analogies to American and English 
judicial opinions, holding that individuals have property rights and 
contractual claims attached to the letters they send, the art they 
produce, and to the negatives and originals of their photographs. 
However, commentators' traditional focus obscures the extent to 
which the rhetorical force of the article stems from Warren and 
Brandeis' skillful exploitation of social attitudes about gender. To see 
this, it is necessary to focus on aspects of The Right to Privacy that 
may first appear incidental. The story that Warren and Brandeis told 
about the "inevitable" 88 progressive development of the rights in 
civilized society described the broadening of the right to life from the 
narrow conception of noninterference with body and property to the 
noninterference with a man's "family relations. " 89 To argue that the 
law had already begun to make progress in the direction of recognizing 
the compensability of offenses to our spiritual natures, they cited a 
line of cases in which parents and husbands were held to have had 
rights of recovery against male seducers. Their recognition of an 
historical "regard for human emotions" 90 was based on cases in which 
remedies were granted for the alienation of a wife's affections91 and 
for wounded feelings, such as shame and dishonor, caused by a 
daughter's seduction. 92 In addition, they relied on Godkin's Scribner's 
88. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. 
89. /d. at 194. 
90. !d. 
91. Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes 577 (1745). Plaintiff's wife had left him 
"unlawfully." During their separation, after inheriting her father's fortune, she died. 
Plaintiff husband alleged that the defendant wanted decedent wife's money, and 
prevented her, against her will, from returning tc him. The court held that the 
husband's alienation claim should prevail because he had completely lost the comfort 
and society of his wife, her aid and assistance in his domestic affairs, and the profit 
and advantage he would have gained from her estate . 
92. Recompensing parents for shame and dishonor, seduction cases were a 
recognized exception to the rule that wounded feelings could not be compensated. 
Under the English law fiction of per quod servitium amisit, parents could maintain 
an action for the loss of a daughter's "services" caused by her seduction and 
pregnancy. When certain cases arose in which the daughter was not living with the 
parents, and thus was not in their "service," the courts created a "constructive 
service" doctrine based on the parents' right to recall the minor daughter into their 
keep at any time, thereby retaining the right to her services. Thus, the courts 
endeavored mightily to ensure that parents' moral grief over feminine transgressions 
would be compensable. See, e.g., Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612 (1881); Phelin v. 
Kenderine, 20 Pa. St. 354 (1835); Martin v. Payne, 9 John. 387 (1812); Bedford v. 
McKowl, 3 Espinasse 119 (1800). 
L 
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essay, in which he vehemently argued for a greater appreciation of a 
man's reputation, with scant mention of women except as targets of 
social opprobrium for their misdeeds . 93 
Warren and Brandeis took pains to point out that the loss of 
services by female family members was not the only or central point 
of the right to recovery in the seduction cases. The doctrine of lost 
services, they implied, is a surrogate in the common law for an 
unarticulated doctrine akin to the doctrine of privacy they sought to 
advance. 94 
Women appear in the Warren and Brandeis article as seduced 
wives and daughters. They also appear through the memorable image 
of a prima donna in tights, "caught on the stage by a camera" - as 
the New York Times would report-but spared public mortification 
by a judicious court. 95 As noted, one of the specific privacy abuses 
that motivated the Warren and Brandeis article was invasive uses of 
photography. They thought photographic technology led to uncon-
scionable, indiscriminate exposure to public view. Thus, Warren and 
Brandeis cited with approval the 1890 case of Mana/a v. Stevens & 
Meyers, in which an actress who had been surreptitiously photo-
graphed by her employer while the actress was dressed in tights 
successfully enjoined the publication of the photograph. The New 
York court granted Marion Manola an ex parte injunction to restrain 
the publication of her photograph, "owing to her modesty. " 96 The 
defendant never appeared to contest the injunction. 97 
While Marion Manola was not within the private precincts of 
domestic life at the time the photograph was taken, and had been 
openly performing before the public, Warren and Brandeis had no 
problem exploiting her case for their argument. For indeed, viewed 
in one light, Marion Manola's case was their argument. Warren and 
Brandeis could safely assume that most readers conceived of women 
as creatures of special modesty. 98 The photographic assault on Man-
93. Godkin, supra note 13, at 60. 
94. See Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612 (1881); Phelin v. Kenderine, 20 Pa . St. 
354 (1835); Martin v. Payne, 9 John . 387 (1812); Bedford v. McKowl, 3 Espinasse 
119 (1800). 
95. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1890, at 2, col. 3. See also Warren and Brandeis, 
supra note 1, at 193, 195. 
96. N.Y . Times, June 15, 1890, at 2, col. 3. 
97. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 n. 7. 
98. An analysis of men's privacy claims provides an interesting counterpoint 
to the argument that gender inequality affected the courts and influenced the outcome 
of similar cases in dissimilar ways . In Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 
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ola's modesty was a paradigm of the kind of privacy invasion they 
thought the law ought to have remedied. The appeal to Mana/a was 
anything but peripheral to their article's argument. 99 Warren and 
Brandeis cited Mana/a as a clear example of judicial protection of 
inviolate personality and delicate feelings injured by unwanted public-
ity. The case was particularly strong for their purposes because it 
involved the courts going so far as to protect the residual modesty of 
an "undeserving" woman who had behaved immodestly in the first 
place and assumed the risk of even broader exposure. If courts must 
ascribe privacy rights to a stage actress, then clearly they also must 
ascribe privacy rights to ordinary men and women who live quietly 
and discreetly at home. 
C. COURTS MANAGE MODESTY 
In both Mana/a and De May, the courts went remarkably far to 
compensate female plaintiffs for privacy losses. The outcome of 
another late nineteenth-century case demonstrates a court going to 
great lengths to defend a woman's modesty. In Union Pacific Railway 
Company v. Botsford, 100 the United States Supreme Court echoed the 
sentiment that "the right to one's person" is the right "to be let 
alone.'' 101 
Mrs. Clara Botsford brought suit against a railroad company for 
head injuries she sustained while a passenger. The railroad requested 
the trial court to compel Mrs. Botsford to submit to a physical 
examination, assuring the court that the examination would be con-
ducted by her personal physician and in such a manner as "not to 
expose the person of the plaintiff in any indelicate manner.'' 102 The 
court refused the request, Mrs. Botsford received a $10,000 award, 
and the. railroad appealed. 
The Supreme Court declared that ''the inviolability of the person 
is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a 
blow." 103 It reasoned that a person should never be compelled to 
N.Y.S. 240 (N.Y . Sup . Ct. 1891), a physician successfully obtained an injunction 
against the unauthorized publication of his name in a medicine advertisement. 
Although the right to privacy was not discussed by the court, the injunction was 
granted under an implied right for the physician "to be let alone." 18 N. Y .S. 240 
(1890). 
99. But see PEMBER, supra note 7, at 55 (describing Mana/a and DeMay as 
"peripheral cases"). 
100. 141 u.s. 250 (1891). 
101. !d. at 251. 
102. !d. at 250. 
103 . !d. at 250. 
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expose her body for the purposes of a civil action, and that any 
unreasonable refusal to show injuries would only constitute a fact to 
be considered by the jury. Finding, therefore, that the trial court had 
no power to compel an examination, the Court affirmed the judgment. 
Eleven years later, in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding 
Box Company, 104 the New York Court of Appeals seemed more 
concerned with the orderly growth of the law than with the claims of 
modesty. In Roberson, the defendant box company manufactured 
and distributed 25,000 copies of an advertisement for flour, each one 
bearing plaintiff Roberson's likeness. The advertisements were con-
spicuously displayed in stores, saloons, warehouses, and other public 
areas near Roberson's residence. Miss Roberson, who had not au-
thorized the use of her likeness, complained of humiliation and severe 
nervous shock she suffered as the result of the jeers and remarks of 
people who recognized her from the advertisements. 
Roberson's request for an injunction and damages was granted 
by the lower court on the ground that the defendant's unauthorized 
publication and circulation of her likeness for profit violated her right 
to privacy105 and her property right in the use of her likeness. 106 In 
the appellate division, the judgment was affirmed even though the 
court could find no controlling precedent. However, the New York 
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision by a margin of 
four to three. Its principal reasons for the reversal were that (1) there 
was no precedent on point, (2) equity could not enjoin the defendant 
from merely hurting the plaintiff's feelings, and (3) recognizing a 
privacy or property right in a person's face would spawn litigation 
and restrict liberty of speech and freedom of the press. The court 
mentioned the Warren and Brandeis article, but found its argument 
for protecting inviolate personality unconvincing: 
104. 65 N.Y.S. 1109, aff'd 64 App. Div. 30, 71 N.Y.S. 876 (1901), rev'd 171 
N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Cf. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. , 122 Ga. 
190, 50 S.E . 68 (1905) (male plaintiff has privacy right in case against defendant who 
appropriated photographic image). 
105. Privacy is regarded as a product of civilization, [which] implies an 
improved and progressive condition of the people in cultivated manners and 
customs with well-defined and respected domestic relations. The privacy of 
the home in every civilized country is regarded as sacred, and when it is 
invaded it tends to destroy domestic and individual happiness. It seems to 
me, therefore, that the extension and development of the law so as to 
protect the right of privacy should keep abreast with the advancement of 
civilization. 
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 65 N.Y.S. 1109, 1111, aff 'd 64 A.D. 30, 
71 N.Y.S. 876 (1901), rev'd 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
106. "Every woman has a right to keep her face concealed from the observation 
of the public. Her face is her own private property." !d. 
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An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion 
that the so-called "right of privacy" has not as yet found an 
abiding place in our jurisprudence, and . . . the doctrine 
cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled 
principles of law by which the profession and the public have 
long been guided. 107 
Although Roberson lost her case in the Court of Appeals, the 
standard of female modesty prevailed in the court of popular opinion. 
The Roberson decision was criticized in the press and by the bar. A 
year after the decision, the New York legislature enacted a narrowly 
drawn privacy statute, providing a remedy in cases where the name 
or picture of a person has been appropriated for commercial adver-
tising purposes. 108 Judge Denis O'Brien, who had concurred in Rob-
erson, was sufficiently perturbed by the public outcry that he wrote 
a law review article responding to the criticism. 109 O'Brien asserted 
that any harm suffered must have been to Miss Roberson's person or 
to her character because a lady has no property right in her form and 
features. Property rights in one's visage "would be altogether too 
coarse and too material a suggestion to apply to one of the noblest 
and most attractive gifts that Providence has bestowed upon the 
human race. A woman's beauty, next to her virtues, is her earthly 
crown . . . . " 110 
One critic of an early privacy case involving the unwanted 
publication of a young woman's portrait suggested that the case might 
have gone the other way, had the plaintiff been the judge's daughter. 111 
This observation underscores the paradox facing women who brought 
privacy claims in courts during this period: even when they won, they 
did not really win. One way or the other, their claims would be 
analyzed and decided according to the conventional perspectives of 
the individual judges before whom they appeared. Typical judges were 
likely to be strongly influenced by pervasive notions of a need to take 
special care to preserve women's modesty as among their chief virtues. 
107. Roberson, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 447. 
108. Civil Rights Law, Laws of 1903, ch. 132, sec. 2, p. 308. 
109. O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 CoLU?>L L. REV . 437 {1902). 
110. !d. at 439 . 
111. See id. at 437. Judge O ' Brien , however, disagreed , saying "that argument 
doubtless has some weight with the 'promiscuous lay public' although it really 
imputes to the judges rather a low standard of integrity since it contains the suggestion 
that their decisions may be contro lled by their private interests or personal affections ." 
!d. at 448 . 
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Focussing on the nineteenth-century standard of female modesty 
and seclusion presents the Warren and Brandeis article in a new light. 
This new focus may help to explain why certain early privacy cases 
which seem silly or petty today were brought in the first place, or 
why plaintiffs won. We have in mind cases like Atkinson v. John 
Doherty & Co., 112 in which a widow sought to enjoin the use of her 
deceased husband's name and picture on a cigar label; Schuyler v. 
Curtis, 113 in which the erection of a statute in honor of a prominent 
woman was protested by her family; Smith v. Doss114 in which sisters 
complained that their notorious father's faked death was republicized 
in a radio broadcast; and Peay v. Custis, 11 5 in which a female cab 
driver's photo was published in a satirical article about Washington, 
D .C. taxis. 116 
We also have in mind Kunz v. Allen. 117 In Kunz, a woman who 
had been shopping in a dry goods store was filmed by the owners 
without her knowledge or consent. The merchants used their film of 
her "face, form and garments" 118 to advertise their business in a local 
theatre, causing the plaintiff to become ''the common talk of the 
people in the community." 119 It was said that people thought "that 
she had for hire permitted her picture to be taken and used as a 
public advertisement." 120 She brought suit for damages for invasion 
of privacy, but the case was dismissed for failure to show actual 
damages. 
On appeal, the court reversed the judgment, contending that if 
strangers were permitted to use a person's pictures without her consent 
for advertising purposes, they could exhibit it anywhere: "It may be 
posted upon the walls of private dwellings or upon the streets. It may 
ornament the bar of the saloonkeeper, or decorate the walls of a 
brothel." 121 Because of these lurking dangers, the court agreed that 
no one's face and features should be subject to nonconsensual com-
mercial uses and recognized a valid claim for invasion of privacy. 
112. 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899). 
113. 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895). 
114. 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948). 
115. 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948). 
116. Cf. Milner v. Red River, 249 S.W.2d 227 (1952) (republication of deceased 
criminal indictment did not invade survivors' privacy). 
117. 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918). 
118. Id. 
119. Id . 
120. Id. 
121. Kunz, 102 Kan. at 884, 172 P. 532, 533 (quoting Pavesich v. New England 
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 218, 50 S.E. 68, 80 (1905)). 
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Similarly, in Graham v. Baltimore Post Co., 122 the court held 
that a woman has a claim for the unauthorized publication of her 
picture in a newspaper advertisement. 123 While the judge's expansive 
treatment of the development of privacy rights was admirable, he 
presented a discriminatory face when he announced that, "the same 
act that might well be a violation of the right of privacy, as applied 
to a woman, might be dismissed, with legal indifference, as applied 
to a man ." 124 He also suggested that the social standing of a female 
plaintiff and the media organ would be relevant to her privacy claim, 
writing that, "[a] debutante's picture published ... in the social 
section of a respectable Sunday supplement, or in certain magazines 
... might be unauthorized, but at the same time be unobjectionable 
when weighed by accepted standards of propriety ." 125 
Drawing from Melvin v. Reid, 126 and echoing Warren and Bran-
deis' cultivated rhetoric, the judge also announced that disclosure of 
the past life of an "otherwise exemplary woman" 127 was actionable 
when the story would merely increase readership by ''pandering to 
the maudlin curiosity and insatiate appetite of growing debased public 
taste." 128 The judge went even further, referring to an east Indian 
case in which a neighbor was granted relief against a man who had 
built his house so that he could see from his window the neighbor's 
wife and daughters when they were unveiled, a disgrace to women 
under Hindu custom. 129 From this, the judge referred to the custom 
of American widows to wear veils, and asked: "May not a woman, 
choosing to withdraw to seclusion, withhold her countenance from 
public gaze, even on the street? Has the press any more right to force 
her face on the front page, than a photographer would have to lift 
her veil on the street and take her photograph?" 130 
It is clear that paternalistic, patriarchal concern for feminine 
modesty and virtuous seclusion provided the judge with the basis 
upon which to rationalize his decision. Later courts and judges often 
followed suit, sometimes treating interference with female modesty as 
122. (Bait. Super. Ct. 1932) , reported in 22 KY. L.J. 108 (1933). 
123. !d. 
124. !d. at 116. 
125 . !d. 
126. 112 Cal. App . 285, 297 P . 91 (1931) (film's depiction of former prostitute 
invaded her privacy). 
127. Graham, 22 KY. L.J. 108, 116. 
128 . !d. at 116. 
129. !d. at 116-17. 
130. !d. at 119. 
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the paradigm privacy tort. 131 Some courts, like the court in Graham, 
explicitly acknowledged that the sex of the plaintiff is relevant to 
liability in privacy cases. 132 
IV. 
A . THROUGH A WOMAN'S EYES 
Published in 1890, the Warren and Brandeis article prescribed a 
legal right to a private home and family life that included rights 
protecting female modesty and seclusion. But 1890 was the year of 
131. See, e.g., Bennett v. Norban , 396 Pa. 94, 99, !51 A.2d 476, 479 (1959) 
(" If a modest young girl should be set upon by ... ruffians who did not touch her 
but by threats compelled her to undress, give them her clothes, and flee naked 
through the streets, it could not be doubted that her privacy had been invaded as 
well as her clothes stolen. " ) (emphasis added) . 
132. Graham, 22 KY. L.J. 108, 116 (1933); see also Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 
Mo . 1199, !59 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1942) . 
The argument that gender bias has affected the reasoning or outcome of privacy 
cases is strengthened by comparing early women's privacy cases with early cases in 
which men claimed violations of their privacy rights. Warren and Brandeis defended 
spirituality or personality, not reputation and property, as the essence of the privacy 
tort. Nevertheless, courts emphasized the inherent or economic importance of repu-
tation, good name, and community standing in men's privacy cases. See, e.g., 
MacKenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (male 
physician successfully enjoined unauthorized publication of name in medicine adver-
ti sement); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (N.Y. Sup . Ct. 1893) 
(unauthorized publication of man's name and picture in newspaper enjoined); Paves-
ich v. New England Life Ins. Co ., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E . 68 (1905) (artist sought 
damages for unauthorized use of his photograph in advertisement); Edison v. Edison 
Polyform Mfg. Co . , 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907) (action to enjoin use of 
name and likeness on medicine label and advertisements); Foster-Milburn Co. v. 
Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W . 364 (1909) (senator sues over unauthorized use of 
name and likeness in medicine advertisement); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 
134 S.W. 1076 (1911) (action for unauthorized publication of boy's picture in 
advertisement) ; State ex rei. La Follette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash . 86, 229 P. 317 (1924) 
(politician successfully enjoined use of his name by unaffiliated group). 
Although reputational and economic concerns loomed large in early men's 
privacy cases, injuries to sensibilities were not wholly ignored. See, e.g., Marks v. 
Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S . 908, 909 (N .Y. Sup . Ct. 1893) ("Private rights must 
be respected, as well as the wishes and sensibilities of people."). But in men's cases, 
rhetorical appeal to a need for social standing and property was typically more 
pronounced than rhetorical appeals to feelings and sensibilities . Moreover, the 
sensibilities referred to in men' s cases were never overtly or intentionally gendered as 
masculine traits. And finally, modesty concerns, so prevalent in women's cases, were 
virtually absent in the men's cases . 
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the New Woman, the Gibson Girl. 133 By then, women were coming 
to realize that they had had too much of the wrong kinds of privacy. 
Affluent, urban women sensed that they had been confined for too 
long to the "private sphere" of domestic and caretaking roles. As 
wives and mothers, women typically lacked the solitude and peace of 
mind which privacy romantics like Warren and Brandeis associated 
with homelife. Women also lacked privacy in the controversial sense 
of decisional autonomy over marriage, sex, and reproduction. Cloaked 
behind conventions of modesty and retreat, women had enjoyed few 
meaningful forms of personal privacy. 
Warren and Brandeis published an article that was deeply con-
ventional and conservative when it came to gender. Far from privacy 
revolutionaries, they were men of their times whose essay presents a 
certain elitist, patriarchic view of privacy's importance. When it came 
to women's privacy, the Warren and Brandeis article lacked vision. 
A good way to make this point stick is to compare the Warren 
and Brandeis article to a book written in the same decade by the 
utopian feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman. 134 Begun in 1888, two 
years before Bostonians Warren and Brandeis published The Right to 
Privacy from nearby Cambridge, Massachusetts, Women and 
Economics135 was published in Boston in 1898. Gilman may not have 
read The Right to Privacy, but she devoted a chapter of her book to 
exploding myths the Warren and Brandeis article enshrined. Women 
and Economics had an ''immediate and enormous impact on radical 
and reform writers and critics,'' elevating Gilman into the position of 
a leading intellectual of the women's movement. 136 
The subject of Gilman's book is American women's predominant 
role in the expanding industrial economy. Women, she said, are 
domestic toilers, economically dependent upon men for their necessi-
ties, luxuries, and status. 137 Denied free productive expression, 138 sex-
133. Cj. R. RosENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES 54 (1982) (By 1890 American 
magazine writers could point to the "New Woman," the physical, extroverted, 
independent woman with ambitions that included a life outside home.); L. BANNER, 
supra note 47 at 21-22 (New Women , typified by Charles Dana Gibson's artistic 
depictions in a series of Life magazine drawings, were praised by feminists and both 
praised and derided by the press.). See also C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY 
CONDUCT 46 (1985) . 
134. See A. LANE, To HERLAND AND BEYOND: THE LIFE AND WoRK OF CHAR-
LOTTE PERKINS GILMAN (1990) . 
135. C. GILMAN, supra note 10. The book was originally published under the 
name Charlotte Perkins Stetson. Gilman later remarried and again changed her name. 
136. A. LANE supra note 134, at 253 . 
137. C. GILMAN, supra note 10, at 18-22. 
138. !d. at 117-118. 
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distinction and attraction are women's means of "getting a liveli-
hood." 139 While men expend their energies in "struggle in the mar-
ketplace as in a battlefield, " 140 women overestimate the so-called 
duties of their position and overconsume goods and services. 14 1 The 
resulting "sexuo-economic" relation of man and woman debases 
female character, commercializes love, and dampens family feeling. 142 
Looking to the future, Gilman predicted that, "[t]he free woman, 
having room for full expression in her economic activities and in her 
social relation, will not be forced so to pour out her soul in tidies 
and photograph holders. The home will be her place of rest, not of 
uneasy activity." 143 
Gilman offered a traditional proverb to summarize her estimation 
of women's lot: "A woman should leave her home but three times-
when she is christened, when she is married, and when she is bur-
ied." 144 The condition of women is "confinement to the four walls of 
the home," 145 and yet confinement limits women's ideas, information, 
thought-processes, and powers of judgment. "[O]nly as we live, think, 
feel, and work outside the home, do we become humanely developed, 
civilized and socialized." 146 
The subject of privacy arises in Women and Economics as a 
powerful myth and ideal of homelife. The "privacy of the home," 
she wrote, is the reason given for limiting women to domestic roles. 
The popular assumption is that homes are crucial preserves of personal 
privacy. Someone must maintain them, and women have that role. 
To undercut the privacy argument for female confinement, Gilman 
made a number of realistic counter-arguments. She contended that, 
to a remarkable degree, our homes are not as private as we like to 
think .147 If we are affluent, our homes are filled with servants and 
service providers who inevitably learn our closest secrets. 148 Family 
139. !d. at 38. 
140. !d. at I 19. 
141. !d. at 119-120. 
142. !d. at 121. 
143. !d. at 257. 
144. !d. at 65. Gilman offered another telling proverb: "The woman, the cat 
and the chimney should never leave the house." !d. 
145. !d. 
146. !d. at 222. 
147. !d. at 258-260 ("The home is the one place on earth where no one of the 
component individuals can have any privacy. A family is a crude aggregate of persons 
of different ages, sizes, sexes, and temperaments, held together by sex-ties and 
economic necessity .... "). 
148. Of all popular paradoxes, none is more markedly absurd than to hear 
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homes without servants are also no guarantors of true privacy, 
especially in the case of women, who face special obstacles to mean-
ingful privacy .149 Moreover, the urban poor cannot afford the kinds 
of homes that answer the privacy needs of family members. Their 
crowded lives are "distinctly degrading ." 150 
One of Gilman's proposed solutions to women's special privacy 
problems as "dependent mother, servant wife" 15 1 was for families to 
take their meals away from home or collaborate on meals to provide 
good food more efficiently .152 Whatever the solution, the important 
point for Gilman was that women's lack of meaningful opportunities 
for individual privacy is tied to their economic role. To have real 
privacy, women would have to be freed from their limited role in the 
economy as mere housekeepers and mothers. But Gilman did not 
reject family, "home comforts," and intimacy as such. She simply 
argued for norms of privacy and private life that permit for women 
no less than for men "the highest development of personality" 153 
consistent with "the society of those dear to us." 154 
us prate of privacy in a place where we cheerfully admit to our table-talk 
and to our door service-yes, and to the making of our beds and to the 
handling of our clothing-a complete stranger ... . 
!d. at 255. 
Xenophobia can be seen in Gilman's mentioning the possibilities that one's 
servant might be of "an alien race" and worse, "a stranger by breeding." !d. at 
256. Gilman was not always above the class, race, and sex prejudices of her day. 
149. The progressive individuation of human beings requires a personal 
home, one room each for each person .... [F]or the vast majority of the 
population, no such provision is possible. To women, especially, a private 
room is a luxury of the rich alone .... At present any tendency to withdraw 
and live one's own life on any plane of separate interest or industry is 
naturally resented, or at least regretted by the other members of the family. 
This affects women more than men, because men live very little in the 
family and very much in the world .... [T]he women and children live in 
the home-because they must. For a woman to wish to spend time elsewhere 
is considered wrong, and the children have no choice .... Yet the home 
ties bind us with a gentle dragging hold that few can resist. Those who do 
resist, and who insist upon living their individual lives find that this costs 
them loneliness and privation; and they lose so much in daily comfort and 
affection that others are deterred from following them. 
!d. at 258, 259-60. 
150. Jd. at 258 ("The effects of such grouping on modern people is known in 
the tenement districts of large cities, where families live in single rooms; and these 
effects are of a distinctly degrading nature.") . 
151. !d. at 262. 
152. !d. at 225-270. 
153 . !d. at 260. 
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Warren and Brandeis' sentimental attachment to the privacy of 
the home takes on an interesting complexion in view of Gilman's 
claim that it is one of the great "fatuous absurdities, mere dangling 
relics of outgrown tradition, slowly moulting from us as we grow.'' 155 
Granted, Gilman might have agreed that the press, gossip, and 
photography pose serious threats to modesty and feelings. She might 
have agreed with Godkin that reputational damage is a troublesome 
consequence of many privacy invasions. But she clearly would have 
eschewed uncritical appeal to the "privacy of the home" and "invi-
olate personality" as co-rationalizations for a new legal privacy right. 
\Vhat good is ''inviolate personality'' when one is female and not 
permitted the "highest development of personality?" How can private 
and domestic life be sacred precincts, if one cannot escape them or 
disaggregate oneself within them? 
B. FIRST CENTURY THEORY 
Over one hundred years after the Warren and Brandeis article, 
legal discussions of the privacy tort are largely silent about the social 
reality of gender bias and its impact on privacy law. Gender-conscious 
discussion of privacy has been too often relegated to constitutional 
law and to the abortion debate, where conceptual controversies about 
the application of "privacy" make fruitful inquiry difficult. 156 Privacy 
tort scholars have consistently overlooked concern about women's 
privacy as a force in the development of the privacy tort. Scholars 
seldom focus squarely on the possibility that gender may have a role 
in explaining the shape of precedent. 
Kim Scheppele's comparison of Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 157 
and Melvin v. Reid158 is illustrative. 159 These two influential cases have 
analogous facts and different putcomes. They thus represent a special 
explanatory challenge to Scfieppele's excellent effort to present a 
unified, contractarian, descriptive theory of the law of privacy and 
secrecy. 
154. !d. at 260, 271. 
155. !d. at 248. 
156. Allen, Privacy, Private Choice and Social Contract Theory, 56 CrN. L. 
REV . 461 (1987). 
157. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). 
158. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). 
159. K. ScHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 218-19 n.45 (1988). 
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As an eleven year old, William James Sidis had been a prodigy 
in mathematics. 160 A reporter for the New Yorker discovered that 
Sidis the adult worked as a clerk and lived in a tiny, run-down 
apartment. After an article disclosing these facts was published in the 
magazine's "Where Are They Now?" feature, Sidis sued for invasion 
of privacy. He lost. The plaintiff in Melvin v. Reid161 was a former 
prostitute and one-time murder suspect. She won her case, claiming 
that the film "The Red Kimono" told her life story , using her actual 
maiden name in violation of her pr ivacy rights. Finding in her favor, 
the court stressed that the plaintiff had become a housewife and now 
" lived an exemplary, virtuous, honorable and righteous life ." 162 
Why did the former prostitute prevail and the child prodigy lose? 
How can the two cases be squared? Scheppele struggled to 
give an account of why Sidis lost his case and Melvin won hers. 163 A 
possibility Scheppele failed to draw out is that the gender of the 
plaintiffs made a crucial difference to the perceived seriousness of 
unwanted publicity. Viewed in social context, the woman who wished 
to conceal a past of prostitution may have presented a more compel-
ling claim than the man who wanted to conceal that he had failed to 
have the brilliant career anticipated, precisely because she was a 
woman and he was a man. 
It is impossible to rule out attitudes about gender in accounting 
for judicial behavior. But it does not follow that the courts' attitudes 
about gender are always salient features of privacy cases. Nor does it 
follow that the outcome of tort cases can be wholly explained or 
predicted by reference to gender and attitudes about it. In fact, our 
examination of privacy cases, including the cases state and federal 
courts have used as vehicles for recognizing privacy torts, suggests 
the contrary. In many cases in which plaintiffs were women, gender 
appears to have been of little significance to the existence, reasoning, 
or outcome of the cases. 164 
160. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co ., 113 F .2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 
U.S. 711 (1940). 
161. 112 Cal. App . 285, 297 P. 9 1 (1 931) . 
162. !d. at 286. 
163. It may seem diffi cult to square Melvin with Sid is since in both of them 
the subjects' unique and vi sible pasts made identification [i.e . , use of their 
real names] reasonable . P erhaps the di fference lies in the degree of harm 
caused by the connection in the persons ' present life with the person's past 
deeds. Sidis was being identified with a praiseworthy past while Melvin was 
being identified with a discreditable past. As was mentioned earlier, .. . 
publicizing information that puts the subject in a good light does not seem 
to be actionable . 
K. SCHEPPELE , LEGAL SECRETS, at 218-19 n.45 (198 8). 
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Yet, for better or worse, concern for the boundaries of women's 
privacy has played a significant role in establishing and shaping legal 
precedent for the right of privacy. Cases involving characteristically 
female experiences, such as childbirth, 165 objectification by reason of 
beauty, 166 sexual harassment in the workplace, 167 breach of confiden-
tiality in the welfare system, 168 rape publicity, 169 and adoption 170 have 
contributed to shaping state and federal doctrine and clarifying the 
meaning of legal privacy. Future privacy scholars must consider gender 
as they seek to explain the dimensions, successes, and failures of the 
privacy tort. 
The relevance of gender is now widely discussed by legal scholars 
in many fi elds of public and private law, including, to a limited 
extent, tort law. But privacy tort scholars have not yet exploited the 
lllumination-and the justice-gender sensitive analysis of the law 
potentially generates. We have already argued that Blaustein misread 
De lvfay in his attempt to establish generic human dignity as the 
normative basis of all privacy law protections. Blaustein went astray 
when he sought to explain the past without acknowledging the signif-
icance of gender. Adding insult to injury, he posited a future class of 
aspiring Cinderellas who will delight in uninvited publicity and there-
fore have weak damage claims. 171 
(requirement of police photographing and fingerprinting of liquor industry workers 
not an invasion of privacy); Eick v. Perk Dog Food, 347 Ill. App . 293, 106 N.E.2d 
742 (1952) (blind girl's photo used without consent in connection with advertising 
campaign) . 
Female gender may have had a subtle role in privacy cases like Reed v. Ponton, 
15 Mich .App . 423, 166 N.W.2d 629 (1968) and Hendry v. Connor, 303 Minn. 317, 
226 N.W .2d 921 (1975), since women were more likely to shop, tend to sick children, 
and be poor. Male gender was not an irrelevant feature of Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 
N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (Ct. Err. & App . 1907) (man alleged that use of his name on 
his putative child's birth certificate invaded his privacy). 
165. De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W . 146 (1881) . 
166. Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box, 32 Misc. 344, 65 N.Y.S. 1109 (1900), 
ajj'd, 64 A.D. 30, 71 N.Y.S. 876 (1901) , rev 'd, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
167 . Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So . 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) . 
168. Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 
(Pa. Super. 1984) . 
169. Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co ., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962); 
Cox Broadcasti ng v. Cohn, 420 U.S . 469 (1975); B.F.J . v. Florida Star, 109 S.Ct. 
2603 (1989) . 
170. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706 , 696 P .2d 527 (1985). 
171. " Undoubtedly, there will be cases in which the publication of a name 
or likeness without consent is a boon and not a burden. Rather than 
suffering humiliation and degradation as a result, the beautiful but unknown 
girl pictured on the cover of a nationally circulated phonograph record 
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An insightful article by Robert Post 172 is nonetheless disappointing 
for reasons not unlike the reasons that the Warren and Brandeis 
article is disappointing. To his credit, Post observed that "care must 
be taken in evaluating the universalist pretensions of the tort of 
intrusion." 173 He further warned that, "[u]nder conditions of cultural 
heterogeneity, the common law can become a powerful instrument 
for effacing cultural and normative differences." 174 Yet, his article 
which purported to describe the interplay between communities and 
selves, omitted women's social experiences. The article blind-sides 
both the specific respects in which the traditional family and the 
mother-child relationship pose special challenges for the concept of 
the home as a socially defined precinct of privacy, and the role that 
concern for women has played in the development of the normative 
foundations of the privacy torts. 
Post maintained "the common law tort of invasion of privacy 
offers a rich and complex apprehension of the texture of social life 
in America." 175 But his article failed to depict that texture as it 
pertains to women's characteristic social experiences. This is especially 
problematic in the face of the argument that women are more prone 
to certain kinds of privacy invasions inside and outside the home than 
are men. 176 Moreover, had Post analyzed the case law and doctrine 
with a keen eye toward cultural differences of gender, he might have 
reached some different theoretical conclusions. 
Take, for example, his claim that in the case of intrusion, privacy 
rules can enable individuals to receive and express intimacy. 177 Post 
might be delighted at having been transfigured into a modern Cinderella . 
Suddenly, she is a national figure, glowing in the limelight, and her picture 
and name have become sought after commodities as a result. Has privacy 
been violated when there is no personal sense of indignity and the commercial 
values of name or likeness have been enhanced rather than diminished? 
I believe that in such a case there is an invasion of privacy, although it 
is obviously not one which will be sued on and not one which is liable to 
evoke community sympathy or command anything but a nominal jury 
award." 
Bloustein, supra note 65, at 990 . 
172. Post, supra note 11. 
173. !d. at 977. 
174. !d. 
175. !d. at 959. 
176. For several reasons, women are arguably more prone to privacy invasions 
when they leave their homes for work or recreation. First, the absence of effective 
sanctions against harassment and women's roles as inferiors and ancillaries emboldens 
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could not have been contemplating the cases involving sexual harass-
ment and public searches of women styled as intrusion cases by the 
courts. In Bennett v. Norban, 178 a woman suspected but innocent of 
shoplifting was accosted in a parking lot by a retailer's employee who 
searched her pockets and handbag. The court held in her favor, as it 
did in the recent case of a maintenance worker whose boss pressed 
her for private facts about her sex life. 179 The privacy rules of intrusion 
in these cases most directly enable individuals to reject, not receive 
intimacy-and to refuse, not express it. In fact, the privacy tort as 
applied to women has often functioned to reinforce the social rules 
of inaccessibility applicable to females. Because he was blind to 
gender, Post seemed unaware of key dimensions of how privacy rights 
function in the social realm. 
v. 
A pair of employment-related cases decided in the 1980s protected 
women's privacy interests but avoided outmoded conceptions of fe-
male modesty and domesticity. 180 In the first case, a self-described shy 
and modest woman subjected to egregious privacy invasions relied on 
the "outrageous conduct" tort to defeat a summary judgment motion. 
In the second case, a woman's damage award for wrongs that included 
one of Prosser's four privacy torts-"unreasonable intrusion upon 
the seclusion of another'' -survived an appeal. 181 Neither case sug-
gested that all women have heightened sensibilities or that protecting 
women's privacy is of special importance to guarding their virtue or 
gender roles. Far from relying upon the assumption that women 
easy rationalization of prying into their affairs; and third, the higher expectations of 
moral conduct to which they are held encourages both surveillance and exposure. See 
A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 141. A significant body of privacy tort law deals with 
women's problems enjoying privacy in public places such as restrooms, fitting rooms, 
dressing rooms, hospitals, the workplace, and on the streets. See id. at 123-152 
(discussing cases). 
177. /d. at 19. 
178. 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) . 
179. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983). 
180. Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or.App . 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981); Phillips v. 
Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So . 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) . 
181. See Prosser, supra note 83, at 383. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
ToRTS § 652(b) (1977) ("One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject 
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person."). 
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belong at home, or that women who venture into the public realm of 
private employment "get what they deserve," these cases implied that 
women who choose to work outside the home are entitled to working 
conditions free of highly offensive intrusions. 
A. STRIP SEARCHING THE CASHIER 
Linda Bodewig instituted a tort action for "outrageous conduct" 
in Oregon state court against her former employer, K-Mart, Inc., and 
a K-Mart customer, Alice Golden. 182 The suit stemmed from an 
incident in which K-Mart employees and Golden persistently accused 
Bodewig of theft and forced her to undergo a strip search. The 
defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds of consent 
and justification were granted by the trial court, but reversed on 
appeal. The case was remanded for trial. 
In March 1979, Bodewig was a part-time cashier at one of K-
Mart's discount department stores. She was ringing up Alice Golden's 
purchases when a dispute arose over the price of a pair of window 
curtains. While Golden went to investigate curtain prices, Bodewig 
moved her purchases to a customer service desk and began checking 
out another customer. 183 
When Golden returned, she insisted that she had left $20 in cash 
with her purchases at the register. Bodewig denied any knowledge of 
the money. The ensuing commotion led the store's thirty-two year old 
male manager to intervene. The manager's search of the check-out 
area, Bodewig's pockets, and the cash register turned up no evidence 
of error or theft. Golden still contended that Bodewig had taken her 
money. 184 
The manager then asked Bodewig to disrobe in the public rest-
room in view of a female assistant manager and Golden to prove that 
she had not taken the money. Bodewig complied. Even after the strip 
search uncovered no money, Golden continued to accuse Bodewig. 185 
On her return to work the next day, Bodewig was told that her 
register keys had been lost, and that she would have to work on the 
register with another clerk. Believing that the store was using this 
stigmatizing procedure to monitor her, Bodewig quit her job at the 
end of her shift. 186 
182. Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or.App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981). 
183. 635 P .2d at 659. 
184. !d. 
185. !d. 
186. !d. at 660. 
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The fact s of Bodewig provided a compelling picture of a young 
woman, who described herself as modest and shy, subjected to a 
humiliating strip search by her employer and an accuser. Yet, to its 
credit, the court did not resort to a circa 1890-style female modesty 
analysis of the intrusion. 
The court determined that K-Mart's employer-employee relation-
ship with Bodewig made it liable for reckless behavior that was 
" beyond the limits of social toleration." 187 The humiliating and 
degrading experience, conducted at the direction of a manager who 
had already ascertained that Bodewig had not taken the money and 
who only ordered the search to prove this to a customer, rose to the 
level of actionable outrageous conduct. The court rejected, as a matter 
of law, K-Mart's claim that Bodewig had consented to the strip 
search. The manager's position of power to hire and fire may have 
led Bodewig to believe she had no choice but to go along with his 
request. 
The appeals court found no special relationship between Golden 
and Bodewig. It nevertheless held that Golden could be liable for 
"outrageous conduct" if a trier of fact found that Golden's having 
persistently accused Bodewig was deliberate, socially intolerable, and 
the proximate cause of emotional distress. 188 
The right to privacy doctrines spawned by Warren and Brandeis, 
and restated by Prosser, played no role in Bodewig. But the case 
plainly involved vindication of privacy-related interests through the 
law. In Bodewig, the outrageous conduct tort did the work a privacy 
tort might have done, and in a way that avoided gender stereotyping. 
B. SEXUALLY HARASSING THE JANITOR 
In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance, 189 the privacy tort itself does 
the work. Brenda Phillips sued her employer in federal court for 
invasion of privacy and violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Phillips claimed she had been wrongfully discharged from her position 
with a maintenance services firm, in violation of Title VII 's sex 
discrimination proscriptions, after she refused to answer questions 
about sex and to perform oral sex. The trial court awarded damages 
and the defendant appealed. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified 
to the Supreme Court of Alabama questions about the scope of state 
common law raised by Phillips' pendent privacy invasion claims. In 
187. !d. at 661. 
188. !d. 
189. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance, 435 So.2d 705 (Ala. 1983). 
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holding that the facts of the Phillips' case supported a claim for 
invasion of privacy, the court did not focus on female modesty. Like 
the Oregon Court of A ppeals in Bodewig , the Alabama court depicted 
the plaintiff as a virtual economic prisoner and thus highly susceptible 
to her employer's offensive demands. 
Shortly a fter Phillips started work as an "overhead cleaner" for 
Ray Smalley, he began calling her into his office several times a week. 
Each time he would lock the door and pose questions about her sex 
li fe . Knowin g that her fam ily was "s ignificantl y financially 
dependent " 190 on her salary , Smalley insis ted that P hil lips have oral 
sex with him or risk losing her job. Once, when Phillips forced her 
way out of his office, Smalley hit her " across the bottom" with his 
hand. 191 Aft er a stressful encounter with Smalley, P hillips one day 
left work early. When she attempted to return , the defendant informed 
her that she had been " laid off, " and she was presented a final pay 
check. 192 
P hillips ' eventual Title VII and privacy invasion action alleged 
damages for chronic anxiety and disruption of family personal rela-
tions. The trial court awarded $2,666.40 in damages for lost wages , 
$10 for battery, and $25,000 for privacy invasion. 
In its consideration of the privacy invasion claim, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama focused on the intentional and highly offensive 
intrusion into Phillips' solitude, seclusion, and private affairs. Relying 
upon the analysis of privacy rights contained in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts 193 and case law, 194 the court held that Smalley's 
assault on Phillips' "personality" or "psychological integrity" was 
actionable. The court reasoned that Smalley's actions easily qualified 
as intrusion upon seclusion even though he did not act surreptitiously, 
publicize Phillips ' private affairs to third parties, or get the sexual 
information and sex he demanded. 195 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court recognized that " Smalley , aware of the importance to Plaintiff 
of her regular income, rendered her , in effect , an 'economic pris-
oner . '''196 
190 . Id . at 707. 
19 1. Id . 
192. !d. 
193 . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
194 . E.g . , Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 43 8 (1972) (s tate statute making it illegal 
to distribute contraceptives to unmarried persons found to be in violation o f the 
Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v . Connecti cut, 381 U .S . 479 (1965) (fundamental 
rights entitled to privacy protection); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa . 94 , 151 A .2d 476 
(1959) (serious interference with anonymity and unreasonable intrusion). 
195. Phillips v. Smalley , 435 So. 2d at 711 (Ala . 1983). 
196. Id. 
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T he future of the common law privacy tort at times appears 
uncertain. 197 Bodewig suggests that at least some privacy interests 
could be protected through actions for emotional distress . But if the 
privacy tort survives as a distinct cause of action , perhaps we shall 
increasingly observe in women's cases the break with the past that is 
evident in the language of Phillips . In both Bodewig and Phillips, 
women satisfactorily performing employment duties were subjected to 
gross invasions of their privacy by employers who exercised economic 
and psychological control over them. Recognizing that the abuse lay 
in a denial of the right to invasion-free employment rather than in 
offended virtue alone, the courts properly resolved the issues by 
emphasizing the right to work and not gender-biased claims of fe male 
modesty. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Warren and Brandeis article initiated a doctrinal revolution 
111 tort law. But the article was business as usual when it came to 
gender. In the nineteenth century , popular views concerning women ' s 
limited capacities, proper role, and special virtues were reflected in 
legislation and court opinions. The law of marriage and family 
contributed to the problem of women's privacy within the home. That 
problem was the problem of too much of the wrong kinds of privacy-
too much modesty, seclusion, reserve and compelled intimacy-and 
too little individual modes of personal privacy and autonomous, 
private choice. 
Warren and Brandeis ' plea for a right to privacy criticized 
interference with home life, personality, and modesty stemming from 
unwanted publicity and circulation of photographs. Unlike their con-
temporary, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Warren and Brandeis were not 
critical of the ways in which homelife, assertions of masculine per-
sonality, and norms of female modesty contributed to women's 
lacking autonomous decisionmaking and meaningful forms of individ-
ual privacy. From the perspective of Gilman's feminism, Warren and 
Brandeis' version of the right to privacy was approaching obsolescence 
at its inception. 
The first century of privacy law scholarship launched by Warren 
and Brandeis has produced increasingly sophisticated analyses . Con-
tinuing the trend, we must hope that the next century also produces 
careful scholarly analyses of the role that attitudes about gender have 
played in the development of privacy law. We must hope also that 
courts will turn self-consciously to the gender factor in privacy tort 
197. See generally Zimmerman , supra note 86. 
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cases. Early jurists sometimes did so, but with an eye toward protect-
ing their patriarchic visions of feminine modesty and domesticity. 
Future courts adjudicating privacy claims have an opportunity to 
focus on gender in new and better ways . A few have already done 
so. Today, women's predominate social status as ancillaries and 
inferiors gives rise to egregious losses of privacy, thoughtlessly or 
maliciously inflicted. 198 The privacy tort is potentially a vehicle for 
legitimating women's claims for peace of mind, dignitarian respect, 
and fair employment. 
198. Women's privacy is an important but not consummate end. It can be 
problematically disregarded by the courts. See Yoekel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 
N.W.2d 925 (Wis. 1956) (woman photographed using toilet in bar failed to recover 
in privacy action). But women's privacy can be reasonably placed second to business 
and economic concerns. See Lewis v. Dayton, 128 Mich .App. 165, 339 N.W.2d 857 
(1983). Lewis shows that women's modesty is not the all consuming interest it once 
was. The court in Lewis held that there was no invasion of privacy where a retailer 
had posted signs warning customers that fitting rooms were under surveillance to 
deter theft. 
